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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUMN1£R J. HATCH and ROBERT M. 
McRAE, 
Plaintiffs 
- vs -
MARY RENZO and TONY RENZO, 
Defendants 
and 
.TESSIE GALLO and LENA 
GALLO, his wife 
Interpleaded Defendants 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11076 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THIS COURT 
STATEMENT 
This case arose from a murder charge against Tony 
Renzo, a son of Mary Renzo, and a brother of Lena 
Gallo, one of the appellants in this case. 
Smuner Hatch, one of the respondents, saw Tony 
Renzo in the county jail and was employed to defend 
him. He told Tony that he wanted $2,000.00. Tony, nor 
his sister Edith Williams, or his sister Jane Korpella, 
had any money or property, so they implored and de-
manded that their sister Lena Gallo, borrow the money 
on her home. 
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On March ~2, HJG3, Lena Renzo Gallo and her hus-
band, Jesse Gallo took Mary Renzo to tlw realty office 
of Fletcher-Lucas Company in Salt Lake City and mort-
gaged their home to them for $2,092.00. The $92.00 was 
for costs in securing the loan. Raymond Fletcher, who 
handled the transaction, made out a check for $2,000.00 
in favor of Lena and Jess<:> Gallo. Raymond Fletcher 
then prepared a note and mortgage for $2,092.00 upon 
the home owned by Mary R<>mo, the subject of this suit, 
and had Mary Renzo sign the papers with her mark, as 
she could neither read or write English. Raymond 
Fletcher was the witness to this signature. This mort-
gage was recorded the same day. Lena and ,Jesse Gallo 
endorsed the check for $2,000.00 and handed it to Mary 
R.enzo, who in turn, gave it to the office of Smnner 
Hatch. 
On April 5, 1965, two weeks later, Hatch or McRae 
met Mary Renzo and her daughter, Edith Williams, and 
secured a mortgage on the home of Mary Renzo for the 
additional sum of $5,500.00 They also secured Tony 
Renzo's name on the note and mortgage, though he had 
no interest therein. 
Mary Renzo also signed with a cross which was 
witnessed by her daughter, Edith Wllliams. The instru-
ment was recorded the same day, April 5, 1965. 
On August 4, 196G, the respondents, 8nmner Hatch 
and Robert McRae, as plaintiffs, brought a suit against 
Mary and Tony Renzo to foreclose the April 5, 1965, 
mortgage, without naming any others who may have a 
rlaim against tht~ property, such as the prior mortgage of 
Lena and Jesse Gallo. 
Lena Gallo called this attorney when her mother, 
who was then liYing with the Gallos, was served. I was 
as unfamiliar with mortgage procedure as Hatch and 
McRa<e~, and I inadvertently filed an answer for Mary 
Renzo and interpleaded Lena and Jesse Gallo as de-
fendants to avoid a default. I then withdrew as Mary 
Renzo's attorney and commenced a suit to foreclose the 
prior mortgage executed by Mary Renzo, to the Gallos, 
without naming Hatch and McRae as defendants. I 
amended the complaint naming Hatch and McRae as 
defendants on November 17, 1966, and they accepted 
service. When they did not answer, I gave them notice 
on Febrnary 13, 1967, that if they did not answer to 
my amended complaint (page 5) that I would take a 
default. 
It was then that a motion was filed by Hatch and 
-McRae on E'ebrnary 17, 1967 to dismiss my amended 
complaint against them and Mary Renzo. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PRE-
JUDICE. CASE No. 166824. 
Und<~r Utah Law, Section 57-3-2 the plaintiffs in case 
No. 1GG288 were charged with notice of the prior record-
ing of tlw Uallo mortgage on the same property plain-
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tiffs and respondents had sued to foreclose, without 
having named these interpleaded defendants and appel-
lants, as defendants under Utah 8ode Annotated 1953: 
"57-3-2 Record imparts notice: l£very convey-
ance, or instrument in writing affecting real 
estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and 
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, 
required by law to be recorded in the office of the 
county recorder shall, from the time of filing the 
same with the recorder for record, impart notice 
to all persons of the contents thereof; and subse-
quent purchasers, mortgagees or lien holders shall 
be deemed to purchase and take with notice." 
The order of priority hetwe0n persons claiming liens 
on the same property by mortgage depends on the re-
spective dates when they were recorded. 59 C.J.S. No. 
242 - Page 313. Under Annotation 10 and all of the 
states cited thereunder. 
The court was aware, or was made aware of plain-
tiffs priority in case No. 166824, yet it dismissed plain-
tiff's amended complaint in said case with prejudice. 
Our position is the court should have joined case No. 
166824 with case No. 166288, and dismissed the inter-
pleaded defendants answer, which would have properly 
preserved the equities and rights of the parties. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF MAY 31, 
1967. 
ThP respondents hase their entire case, and the 
(·onrt follmn•d them, nnder Rule 37 - Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which is refusal to answer. The record 
will show that respondents served counsel for the appel-
lants Notice of taking deposition (page 35) of Lena Gallo 
for 9 :00 A.M. and Jesse Gallo for 9 :30 A.M. and Mary 
Henzo for 10 :00 A.M. and Tony Renzo for 10 :30 A.M. 
and Jane Korpella for 11 :00 A.M., to be taken in the 
office of respondents. 
Mary Renzo, who executed the mortgage, the subject 
of this appeal, is the mother of Lena Gallo, the wife of 
Jesse Gallo, and also the mother of Tony Renzo and Jane 
or Jenny. Tony Renzo and the appellants, Lena Gallo 
and Jesse;. Gallo, learning of the foreclosure suit com-
menced by Hatch and McRae, had a violent quarrel 
which also involved the mother and sister Jenny. 
The day designated for taking of the depositions 
Lena Galo and Jesse Gallo went to the respondents 
office, arriving about 8 :50 o'clock A.M., and Mary Renzo 
and Tony Renzo were already there. Counsel objected 
to having the depositions taken in the presence of Mary 
and Tony Renzo, due to the family feud, and counsel 
mad<' a statement into the record of the reporter, said 
statement is on file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, 
and is inrlndl'd in the designation on appeal. It clearly 
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shows that the appellants were willing to have their depo-
sitions taken now or anytime, bnt to avoid further hostil-
ity it would be to the good of all concerned to submit 
to the depositions without the presence of Mary or Tony 
Renzo. 
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply 
here: The record made at the time will clearly show 
that there wasn't any refusal to have the depositions 
taken, the statement will show that the only objection 
was the presence of the mother and brother, who, with 
Jenny Korpella, were allied ag·ainst these appellants. 
The order of May 31, 1967 in paragraph 1 (quote) : 
"Since the interpleaded defendants Gallo did not 
seek a protective order prior to the scheduled 
time for the taking of their depositions," 
and further in paragraph 2 (quote) : 
"Since the said Galos refused without legal cause 
to submit to the taking of their depositions, plain-
tiffs are entitled to an award of this court." 
And then follows a series of charges amounting to 
$228.40, and it follows in paragraph 3 of said order, 
"It is further ordered as a condition precedent 
to the interpleaded Gallos appearance at the of-
fice of plaintiffs to have their depositions taken, 
that the aforesaid snrns totaling $228.40 be paid 
within 24 hours of the time scheduled for their 
appearance." 
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And paragraph 4 provides that in the event the money 
iw't paid the court will dismiss the answer of the inter-
pleaded defendants (which the court treats as a complaint 
in intervention) will fie 8tl9mililua with prejudice. 
There isn't any question that the Gallo mortgage 
is prior to the plaintiffs as a matter of law, and upon a 
trial on its merits, which appellants are entitled to; and 
appellants prevail in their priorities over the respond-
ents, and at the trial if it is shown that respondents 
an' entitled to any part of the $228.40, the same could 
be credited on the account due the holder of the first 
mortgage. There is nothing in the rules of Utah Civil 
procedure that permits the court to say as a condition 
precedent, either you pay the amount stated or your 
mortgage will be vacated and cast aside, yet that is 
exactly what the court has done here. The court has in 
effect laid the groundwork to supplant a first mortgage 
at law by a second, and inferior mortgage. All of the 
rules of equity have, herein, been violated. 
As to the order stating the appellants did not seek 
a protective order from the court prior to the date of 
taking the depositions, is without merit, for the following 
reason: That the time for taking of the appellants' 
deposition was 9 :00 o'clock A.M. and 9 :30 o'clock A.M., 
followed by the other three. 
Under what circumstances could the appellants fore-
see the presence of the rest of the Renzo family at 9 :00 
o'clock A.M. and 9 :30 o'clock A.M. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO VACATE AND THE COURT ERRED IN 
SIGNING ITS ORDER OF AUGUST 16, 1967. 
The court in its order of Angnst 16, 1967 (page 65) 
treated appellants motion to vacate and set aside, as a 
motion to reconsider, and the court finding such a motion 
is an improper motion and the remedy of the interpleaded 
Gallos should have heen an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Such an order is not an appealable order, as it is 
not the final order or a judgment thereon. 
This court held in Dntry vs. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2nd 
74 - Page 75: 
"It is signnficant that our rules of Civil Proced-
ure do not provide for a motion to reconsider its 
ruling, granting or denying a motion for a new 
trial. Undoubtedly this is advisedly so. The objec-
tive of all rules of procedure is that the parties 
have a full and fair opportunity for a trial and 
determination of the issues between them," etc. 
How then can the Judge below treat a motion to vacate 
and set aside as a motion to reconsider and deny the 
same on those grounds? 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE. 
The motion to strik<-· (P. 37) states in paragraph 1 
that the court is wholy without authority to attach such 
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a condtn precedent to any order wherein a first mort-
gage by law can be vacated and cast aside and substitute 
a second mortgage of record in its place. There is no 
precedent in the law of mortgages or the rules of Utah 
procedme, to justify such action by a court. 
1'o 11phold the court below would trample the law 
of eqnit~' and such a rule should not be permitted by any 
doctrine of jurisprudence. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF OCTOBER 
6, 1967. 
The court will note that the taking of the depositions 
of Lena and Jesse Gallo was noticed for October 11, 1967, 
and the court having previously permitted the mother of 
Lena Gallo and her brother and sister to be present. 
However, plaintiffs and respondents had learned that 
Mary Renzo was, at the time, living with her daughter, 
Edith Williams, in Redwood City, California, so on Sep-
tember 28, 1967, plaintiffs and respondents filed their 
motion (P. GO) and notice of hearing thereof (P. 62) for 
October 13, 1967, requesting the court to compel inter-
pleaded defendants and appellants to pay the costs and 
expenses of Mary Renzo from Redwood City, California, 
to Salt Lake City, and return. The court will also note 
that the deposition of Mary Renzo had previously been 
taken, and respondents' motion asked for expense money 
in order to have the mother present when her daughter, 
Lena Gallo, and her son-in-law's depositions were taken. 
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There is no precedt:•nt for such an order. It is non-
sense and frivolons in the l'xtreme to the judicial minds 
of men - yet the conrt grantl•d th<- motion and signed 
its order, (P. 71) and aPlwllanb specificall)' call the 
attention of the court to page 73 of the courts order 
commencing at paragraph om·, wherein the court :cwts 
out that said plaintiffs may sPne oral notice on counsel 
that the depositions will tlwn•aftc>r be continued until 
November 30, 1967, at~) :00 o'clock A.M., and that on or 
before 5 :00 P . .M., Novemlwr 10, 1967, the intPI'pleaded 
defendants are ordered to deposit with the clerk of the 
above court, round trip travel <'xpPnsc•s for Mary Renzo 
to Salt Lake City, Utah, and back to Redwood City, 
California. Failure to deposit the m01wy by Novemb~r 
10, 1967, and upon certification of the clerk that the 
money was not deposited, all elaims set forth by appel-
lants in this action will be strickPn and dismissed with 
prejudice and give respondents judgment by default in 
accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. 
Appellants might add that the same rwnalty has been 
repeated by the court in every directive and order it has 
made in this case. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT 
BASED ON THE FINDINGS SUBMITTED. 
On October 11, 19()7, 11fN Htt hcbnmty Ml Robert 
McRae, one of the plaintiffa and respondl'nts in the case, 
gave testimony beforP the Honorable 8tt>wart M. Hanson, 
of the District Court of Salt Lake County. 
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The court will note that all of the motions and orders 
' upon which the judgment was predicated, were made 
and issued by the Honorable D. F. Wilkins, of the same 
Court . 
On October 11, 19()7, the same witness made his affi-
davit, a copy of ·which was mailed to opposing counsel 
thr same day (P. 75). Appellants call the courts atten-
tion to varngraph 3 of the affidavit which says: 
"Said attorneys fees and expenses should have 
been paid within 24 hours of the last notice of the 
taking of interpleaded defendants depositions on 
October 11, 1967, at the hour of 9 :00 A.M." 
The affidavit carefully avoids the motion and notice 
(P. 60) which asked for an order compelling the inter-
pleaded defendants to pay the expenses of bringing Mary 
Renzo from California and return, so that she could be 
present to hear the taking of the depositions of her 
daughter and son-in-law. 
This motion was noticed for hearing for October 13, 
1967. ( P. 62). The fact is the motion was heard on 
October 6, 1967, for the reason the appellants Gallo had 
filed a motion to strike, and the same had been noticed 
for October 6, 1967, and it was orally agreed between 
counsel that the motion of plaintiffs and respondents, 
noticed for the 13th, could also be heard October 6, 1967, 
and the court, on October 6, 1967, signed its order grant-
ing- the expenses of Mary Renzo in coming from Cali-
fomi a and return, for the slight and frivolous reason that 
:-;}u~ lH' present, merely as an onlooker, to the taking of 
the depositions. 
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The October 11, 19G7, deposition date is in conflict 
with the courts order of October G, 1967, for the reasons 
following: 
1. Plaintiffs and respondents wPrl' adamant in their 
demands that Mary Renzo and Ton>~ Renzo be present 
when said depositions are taken. 
2. The court in its final order (P. 73) in the first 
paragraph, extends the final tinH' to get Mary Renzo 
here, to November 30th at 9 :00 A.M. and that on or 
before 5 :00 P.M. November 10, 1967, the interpleaded 
defendants are ordered to deposit with the clerk of the 
above court, round trip expenses for Mary Renzo from 
California to Salt Lake City, Utah, and then upon certifi-
cation of the court clerk that thP monies have not been 
paid, the court will strike all claims of the interpleaded 
defendants and dismiss their canse of action with preju-
dice, etc. Where in the record is the certification of the 
clerk. 
3. Would the court have signed a judgment on Oc-
tober 11, 1967, if it had carefully reviewed the record and 
had read the final order of the conrt of October 6, 1967. 
Would the court have signed a judgment on October 11, 
1967, if it had read plaintiffs and respondents motion 
of September 2G, 1967, and the notice calling it up for 
hearing on October 13, 1967. This shows an abandonment 
of the October 11 date. 
In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which 
were fikd October 11, 1967, stress was placed on fraud 
committed on Mary Renzo by th(~ appellants. Where in 
12 
this record is such an inference 1 The note and mortgage 
of the appellants plainly show that the execution of the 
note was witnessed by Raymond Fletcher, of the Fletcher-
Lucas Realty Company, an old and reliable firm, and 
the court below is entitled to hear any evidence of fraud, 
and it in tnrn is entitled to hear the facts relating to 
the execution of the mortgage executed by Mary Renzo, 
after all she did receive a check from the Fletcher-Lucas 
Company for $2,000.00. 
Fraud must be proved clearly and convincingly, and 
can only be done before a court of law by direct testi-
mony, and the court must be fully convinced that fraud 
existed at the time of execution of the mortgage before it 
ean properly vacate and strike it from the record, and 
dismiss with prejudice all claims of the holder thereof. 
There is no sworn testimony before the court on 
which to predicate fraud. 
This case should be reversed and remanded back 
to the court below with instructions as to the rights 
of the parties, and proper costs should be assessed against 
the plaintiffs and respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W.R. Huntsman, 
Attorney for Interpleaded 
Defendants and Appellants 
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